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A B S T R A C T
The present research shows that managers communicate negative feedback ineﬀectively because they suﬀer
from transparency illusions that cause them to overestimate how accurately employees perceive their feedback.
We propose that these illusions emerge because managers are insuﬃciently motivated to engage in eﬀortful
thinking, which reduces the accuracy with which they communicate negative feedback to employees. Six studies
(N = 1883) using actual performance appraisals within an organization and role plays with MBA students,
undergraduates, and online participants show that transparency illusions are stronger when feedback is negative
(Studies 1–2), that they are not driven by employee bias (Study 3), and occur because managers are insuﬃciently
motivated to be accurate (Studies 4a–c). In addition, these studies demonstrate that transparency illusions are
driven by more indirect communication by the manager and how diﬀerent interventions can be used to mitigate
these eﬀects (Studies 4a–c). An internal meta-analysis including 11 studies from the ﬁle drawer (N = 1887)
revealed a moderate eﬀect size (d= 0.43) free of publication bias.
Leaders in organizations need to manage the performance of their
employees eﬀectively so that employees can learn, develop, and meet
organizational objectives. A recent survey of randomly selected HR
professionals based in the United States indicated that almost all
managers (95%) are actively engaged in employee performance man-
agement activities, and that nearly a third (30%) reported that em-
ployee performance management was the single most important
priority within their organization (SHRM, 2014). Performance apprai-
sals are a key mechanism for managing employee performance, a pro-
cess in which managers discuss the performance of their employees
(Aguinis, 2013; Cederblom, 1982; DeNisi & Smith, 2014).
A particularly diﬃcult aspect of performance appraisals is the de-
livery of negative feedback (Bies, 2013). We deﬁne the delivery of
feedback as a communication process in which a feedback provider
(e.g., manager) conveys information to a recipient (e.g., employee;
Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Negative feedback in performance ap-
praisals constitutes the communication of negative information about
an employee’s behavior, performance, or productivity. A common cri-
ticism of performance feedback is that managers do not communicate
such information eﬀectively. For example, a recent performance man-
agement survey conducted in 53 countries showed that only 5% of
employees believed that their managers were skilled in having a candid
dialogue about their performance (Mercer., 2013). These views were
shared by HR professionals – only 2% gave the managers in their
company an “A” grade for their performance management skills
(SHRM, 2014). Finally, several reports have shown that younger gen-
erations tend to expect – and thrive on – more frequent and honest
feedback (Economist, 2015; Finn & Donovan, 2013; Rainer & Rainer,
2011). Jointly, these observations suggest that it has become increas-
ingly important to understand how negative performance feedback can
be delivered more accurately and eﬀectively.
Failing to deliver performance feedback accurately can be extremely
costly for employees, managers, as well as the organizations they work
for, and inaccurate feedback delivery is unlikely to change employee
behavior in ways that are desired by managers (Mercer, 2013; SHRM,
2014). Moreover, inaccurate feedback delivery can lead to mis-
understandings that undermine perceptions of fairness, motivation, and
a willingness to engage in career development (e.g., Bass & Yammarino,
1991; Brett & Atwater, 2001; Heidemeier &Moser, 2009; Wohlers,
Hall, & London, 1993; for a recent review see also DeNisi & Smith,
2014).
Prior research has found that managers often fail to deliver feedback
accurately because they “inﬂate” their feedback by presenting subpar
performance more positively than it should be communicated (Fisher,
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1979; Ilgen & Knowlton, 1980; Larson, 1986). To understand why
managers engage in feedback inﬂation, scholars have advanced ex-
planations which argue that managers intentionally suppress unfavor-
able information to protect themselves from retaliation and shield their
employees from emotional harm (e.g., Fisher, 1979;
Waung &Highhouse, 1997). However, prior research has not con-
sidered the possibility that inﬂation may also be unintentional, such that
managers fail to deliver feedback accurately because they un-
consciously overestimate the clarity and transparency with which they
communicate. This is a critical void in the literature and suggests that
existing interventions that aim to reduce feedback inﬂation may not be
fully eﬀective unless they also take into account such unintentional
bias. Thus, the present research examines whether, when, and why
feedback inﬂation is driven by an unintentional bias whereby managers
overestimate the extent to which they communicate negative feedback
accurately.
We propose that feedback inﬂation can be unintentional because
managers suﬀer from transparency illusions (Gilovich,
Savitsky, &Medvec, 1998; Vorauer & Claude, 1998) that cause them to
overestimate the extent to which their evaluations and feedback are
discernible by their employees. We argue that this occurs because
managers anchor on the message in their own heads and fail to adjust
for how this message is understood by others. This illusion of trans-
parency causes managers to overestimate the extent to which the em-
ployee understands the message they intended to convey. This is a
serious issue for managers; in order to drive performance, they need to
provide feedback to employees and to be accurate in assessing the
employee’s understanding of the feedback provided. They need to en-
sure that the message they thought they conveyed is actually the
message received by the employee. Our prediction is that there is a
disconnect in this exchange and that managers overestimate the extent
to which their feedback is received by employees. Moreover, we predict
that these transparency illusions are stronger as the feedback becomes
more negative because anchoring eﬀects are stronger under emotion-
ally unpleasant conditions (Bodenhausen, Gabriel, & Lineberger, 2000;
Englich & Soder, 2009).
Across six studies, we test whether managers overestimate em-
ployees’ understanding of the feedback provided, whether the valence
of the feedback impacts this bias, and whether this bias can be miti-
gated by increasing managers’ motivation to be accurate (e.g., by
making them aware of potential bias, or by incentivizing them for the
accuracy of their feedback). We test our prediction through a mod-
eration-by-process approach (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) using ac-
curacy motivation interventions at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and
organizational levels. To demonstrate the robustness of our prediction,
we use data from real performance appraisals as well as simulated and
interactive feedback contexts with samples of experienced managers,
undergraduate students, MBA students, and online participants, and
rule out alternative explanations. We also conduct an internal meta-
analysis of our ﬁle drawer to obtain a conservative estimate of the eﬀect
size of the illusion of transparency.
Our studies oﬀer important theoretical and empirical contributions.
First, we show that managers unintentionally overestimate the extent to
which they communicate negative feedback accurately to their em-
ployees. This ﬁnding extends the feedback literature which assumes
that managers have full control over what they communicate and that
feedback inﬂation is thus intentional. Second, we demonstrate that
managers are not only biased at the evaluation and rating stage of the
performance appraisal process (e.g., DeNisi & Smith, 2014; Feldman,
1981; Landy & Farr, 1980), but also at estimating the clarity with which
they communicate their feedback. Third, we provide a parsimonious
explanation for this eﬀect, showing that transparency illusions emerge
because managers anchor on their own thoughts and insuﬃciently
adjust from their own perspective. This insuﬃcient adjustment prevents
managers from accurately assessing the message understood by em-
ployees and, therefore, from clearly communicating feedback to
employees. Finally, we demonstrate that accuracy motivation can be
triggered directly by personal reﬂection, speciﬁc employee requests,
and ﬁnancial incentives. In doing so, our studies extend prior research
on accuracy motivation that has primarily relied on generic, experi-
menter-induced manipulations disconnected from the task at hand and
with little ecological validity (e.g., Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Simmons,
LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 2010; Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz,
Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994).
1. The illusion of transparency in performance feedback
The point of departure for our research is the context of perfor-
mance appraisals, which is deﬁned as “the process by which we eval-
uate the individual performance of an employee over some period of
time” (DeNisi & Smith, 2014, p.131) and may or may not involve the
assignment and communication of a score or rating (Aguinis, 2013;
Cederblom, 1982). An important feature of performance appraisals is
the delivery of feedback. Performance feedback aims to develop, direct,
and reinforce eﬀective behavior in organizations (e.g., Ilgen et al.,
1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Employees who have an accurate un-
derstanding of how managers perceive their performance or their
likelihood of achieving desired outcomes are more likely to respond
appropriately (Ashford & Cummings, 1983).
However, managers often fail to deliver negative feedback accu-
rately because they ﬁnd these discussions uncomfortable and fear that
they adversely aﬀect the well-being of an employee (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Bies, 2013). Indeed, the pro-
spect of these potential negative consequences makes the delivery of
negative feedback an extremely distressing act for managers (Bies,
2013; Harris & Sutton, 1986). To fulﬁll their responsibilities and si-
multaneously cope with the taxing act of giving negative feedback,
managers often inﬂate their feedback by presenting subpar perfor-
mance more positively than they should (Fisher, 1979;
Ilgen & Knowlton, 1980; Larson, 1986). Such feedback inﬂation is per-
vasive and rooted in the fact that people ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to com-
municate negative rather than positive information to others
(Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Tesser & Rosen, 1975).
The predominant assumption of past research has been that the
inﬂation of negative feedback is intentional, such that it requires an
individual’s conscious awareness and deliberate desire (Malle & Knobe,
1997). As a consequence, many feedback interventions have focused on
reducing feedback inﬂation by alleviating managers’ discomforts by
having them communicate negative feedback more indirectly. For ex-
ample, Waung and Highhouse (1997) instructed managers to provide
feedback to poorly performing confederates using either a direct (face-
to-face) or indirect (tape-recorded) feedback medium, and found that
the indirect feedback channel resulted in less inﬂation of feedback than
the direct feedback medium (Waung &Highhouse, 1997). Likewise,
Sussman and Sproull (1999) instructed people to provide feedback
using computer-mediated communication, telephone, or face-to-face
conversation, and found that feedback providers were more accurate,
honest, and comfortable when they used more indirect computer-
mediated communication to deliver the negative feedback than when
they used face-to-face or telephone communication.
We extend this research by proposing that feedback inﬂation also
has an unintentional component. Speciﬁcally, we suggest that even if
managers intentionally communicate feedback more positively than
they should, they still suﬀer from an unintentional bias that leads them
to overestimate how accurately their feedback is communicated to
employees. The idea that managers unintentionally overestimate how
accurately their feedback is understood by employees is based on the
illusion of transparency literature, which suggests that people anchor
on their own internal thoughts and insuﬃciently adjust from them. As a
result, people systematically overestimate the extent to which their
thoughts and intentions leak out and are discernible by others
(Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Gilovich et al., 1998). For example,
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consider a study by Newton (1990) in which participants (“tappers”)
were instructed to tap the melody of a well-known song to other par-
ticipants (“listeners”). Tappers anticipated that about half of the lis-
teners would correctly identify the melody, which was considerably
higher than the actual 3% of listeners who could discern the song.
Newton concluded that the tappers were “so embedded in their own
imaginations […] that they could not recognize how impoverished the
same stimulus was from the perspective of the listener” (Newton, 1990,
p. 44). Transparency illusions have also been invoked to explain why
liars overestimate the detectability of their lies (Gilovich et al., 1998),
why people believe that their feelings of disgust over a foul-tasting
drink are more apparent than they actually are (Gilovich et al., 1998),
and why individuals delivering a public speech think their anxiety is
more apparent to their audience than it actually is (Savitsky & Gilovich,
2003). Accordingly, even when people are aware of their own inten-
tions, they fail to go beyond their own perspective when thinking about
how their thoughts and intentions are discerned by others. Thus, people
unintentionally overestimate how salient their thoughts are to others,
and fail to correct for such biases suﬃciently.
We propose that the illusion of transparency also emerges in per-
formance appraisals where managers need to communicate negative
feedback to their employees and that this can explain why feedback is
often communicated inaccurately. Consider a manager who has con-
cluded that her employee has been underperforming. Although this
manager may not communicate her exact thoughts (e.g., “he is a bitter
disappointment”), she is likely to anticipate that her transmitted feed-
back (e.g., “there are some things I would like you to work on”) is
perceived more accurately by the employee (e.g., that the employee
understands that he really needs to shape up on the next project) than
the feedback is actually perceived by the employee (e.g., “despite a few
minor issues my boss seems to have been quite satisﬁed with my per-
formance”). Speciﬁcally, we propose that – even after taking into ac-
count the fact that managers knowingly inﬂate negative feedback – they
still overestimate the clarity and accuracy with which they commu-
nicate the feedback they provide. In other words, managers expect their
feedback to be perceived as more negative than employees actually
understand it to be.
It is important to examine whether managers are subject to trans-
parency illusions when they give negative feedback to their employees
because past research on cognitive processes in performance appraisals
has predominantly focused on the question of whether the rater (e.g., a
manager) is biased when evaluating the ratee (e.g., a subordinate). That
is, researchers have put their eﬀorts into studying whether rater biases
occur during the observation, storage, retrieval, integration, and rating
stages and have come up with interventions that target the goal of
achieving an accurate performance rating (DeNisi & Smith, 2014;
Feldman, 1981; Harris, 1994; Landy & Farr, 1980). Yet, we propose that
even when managers form accurate judgments and unbiased ratings of
their employees, cognitive biases may still prevent them from commu-
nicating their feedback clearly during the delivery stage. Examining
whether transparency illusions emerge in negative feedback settings is
also important because existing interventions may not be fully eﬀective,
as they tend to focus on reducing intentional rather than unintentional
feedback inﬂation (Sussman & Sproull, 1999; Waung &Highhouse,
1997). We hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. Managers anticipate that employees understand their
feedback more accurately than employees actually do.
2. The role of feedback valence
We propose that feedback providers are subject to transparency il-
lusions because they are anchored too heavily on their own internal
experiences, leading them to insuﬃciently adjust when trying to dis-
cern the recipient’s understanding. This argument implies that the il-
lusion of transparency should be more pronounced for feedback that
triggers a stronger internal experience in managers. One factor that
determines the strength of an internal experience is its valence: nega-
tive events tend to have a stronger impact on peoples’ internal states
than positive ones (Baumeister et al., 2001; Ito, Larsen,
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). This principle has
been coined the “negativity bias” and reﬂects the notion that “negative
events are more salient, potent, dominant in combinations, and gen-
erally eﬃcacious than positive events” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p.
297). Consequently, negative events have stronger eﬀects on informa-
tion processing (Finkenauer & Rimé, 1998), memory
(Finkenauer & Rimé, 1998), and biases (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, &Wheatley, 1998) than positive events. For example, one
study examined gamblers’ spontaneous thinking and found that one
week after placing bets on sporting events, losers spent considerably
more time discussing the game than winners (Gilovich, 1983). This
extended rumination on negative information relative to positive in-
formation may lead to a stronger internal experience, causing managers
to anchor more on their own thoughts. Past research has demonstrated
that the longer people spend on information, the less likely they suﬃ-
ciently adjust away from that information (e.g., Blankenship, Wegener,
Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, &Macy, 2008; Chen & Chaiken, 1999).
Because negative information has a more potent impact on peoples’
own internal states than positive events and because insuﬃcient ad-
justment is more likely to occur when internal states are strong rather
than weak (Gilovich et al., 1998), the illusion of transparency should be
more pronounced as feedback becomes more negative. That is, deli-
vering negative feedback is likely to evoke a strong internal experience
that causes managers to “anchor” more strongly on negative informa-
tion. A stronger internal experience, in turn, makes it more challenging
for managers to adjust away from their own perspective to what em-
ployees may understand, thereby exacerbating the illusion of trans-
parency. In contrast, delivering positive feedback constitutes a rela-
tively weaker internal experience that causes managers to anchor less
strongly on their own information, making it easier to adjust away and
consider what an employee may understand. These arguments are
consistent with the anchoring literature showing that people are
strongly anchored when they are in an unpleasant sad mood, but not
when they are in a pleasant positive mood (Bodenhausen et al., 2000;
Englich & Soder, 2009). More formally, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. The gap between managers’ anticipated understanding
of the feedback and employees’ actual understanding becomes larger as
the feedback becomes more negative.
3. Accuracy motivation as corrective mechanism
In addition to testing whether managers suﬀer from transparency
illusions when delivering negative feedback, we also set out to test why
this would be the case. This is an equally important question to address
because prior research has only speculated about why such illusions
emerge and focused on documenting the prevalence and implications of
the illusion of transparency without clearly articulating or providing
empirical evidence of the underlying mechanism (Cameron & Vorauer,
2008; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). Gilovich et al. (1998) noted the need
for this research explicitly by stating that “further studies […] must be
conducted to delineate the exact nature of the underlying causes of the
illusion of transparency” (p. 344). Thus, an additional goal of our re-
search was to provide insight into the mechanism underlying the illu-
sion of transparency in performance appraisals.
To this end, we propose that managers suﬀer from transparency
illusions because they are insuﬃciently motivated to accurately con-
sider how others perceive their thoughts, speech, and behavior. The
principle of accuracy motivation is based on the ﬁnding that “social
perceivers’ everyday judgmental biases reﬂect cognitive economy ra-
ther than lack of ability” (Thompson et al., 1994). In other words,
people are “cognitive misers” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) that only challenge
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their thoughts and decision-making processes thoroughly when they are
motivated to do so and suﬃcient attention is directed towards a re-
levant outcome (Thompson et al., 1994). Thus, relative to unmotivated
people, those who are motivated to be accurate are less likely to think
that their assessments of reality are “good enough” and, as a con-
sequence, set higher standards for themselves (Simmons et al., 2010).
The notion of accuracy motivation is helpful in explaining why
managers overestimate how clearly employees understand their nega-
tive feedback. Managers are often subject to time pressure, organiza-
tional responsibilities, and other contextual demands (e.g.,
DeVoe & Pfeﬀer, 2011; Simon, 1956; Wright, 1974) and thus not mo-
tivated enough to allocate suﬃcient cognitive resources to performance
appraisals. When accuracy motivation is relatively low and perfor-
mance feedback negative, managers are more strongly anchored on
their own information and less likely to think that they may be over-
estimating the clarity with which they communicate. This results in
more ambiguous, less explicit communication of feedback and a larger
gap in the diﬀerence between the message the manager believes was
sent and the message that was actually received. In contrast, when
accuracy motivation is high, managers should pay more attention to
correcting their own expectations, resulting in clearer, more explicit
communication and reduced transparency illusions.
Hypothesis 3. Increasing managers’ accuracy motivation reduces the
gap between managers’ anticipated understanding of the feedback and
employees’ actual understanding.
4. Accuracy motivation and communication directness
A ﬁnal goal of our research was to examine the eﬀect of increased
accuracy motivation on the way managers deliver their feedback to
employees. According to our reasoning, increasing accuracy motivation
should attenuate transparency illusions because it will motivate man-
agers to communicate their negative feedback more directly to the
employee. Communication directness refers to the extent to which
feedback providers “reveal their intentions through explicit commu-
nication” (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988, p. 100). Thus, if managers
tend to erroneously assume that employees see things the same way
they do, as our theorizing implies, they may not articulate and com-
municate their intentions in a very direct way (Cannon &Witherspoon,
2005; Manzoni, 2002). Indirect communication tends to conceal and
camouﬂage the speaker’s true intentions and is characterized by verbal
messages where the majority of the information is internalized by the
communicator but less information is transmitted in the explicit, coded
part of the message. Thus, it may be diﬃcult for employees to accu-
rately decode their actual performance when managers internalize this
information without explicitly communicating the feedback.
In contrast, managers who are motivated to be accurate are more
likely to recognize that their intentions are not fully apparent to others,
realize that their communicated feedback may be subject to mis-
understanding and, as a consequence, communicate more directly by
rephrasing or clarifying more what they mean. This reasoning is con-
sistent with communicative responsibility theory (Aune, Levine, Park,
Asada, & Banas, 2005). This theory proposes that individuals who rea-
lize that diﬀerent people may have a diﬀerent understanding of the
same message, will assume more communication responsibility and will
be “increasingly explicit and redundant about what they are trying to
communicate” (Aune et al., 2005, p. 360). Based on this reasoning, we
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 4. The eﬀect of accuracy motivation on the gap between
managers’ anticipated understanding of the feedback and employee’s
actual understanding is mediated by communication directness.
5. Overview of the present research
Six studies were conducted to test our hypotheses. Study 1 was a
ﬁeld study and tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the context of an annual
performance appraisal between real managers and employees within an
organization. Study 2 tested the same hypotheses in an experimental,
face-to-face role-play to establish the causal link between valence and
transparency illusions. Study 3 used a sample of MBA students pro-
viding negative feedback to employees face-to-face and involved neu-
tral observers to rule out the alternative explanation that the employee
misinterpreted the message rather than the manager suﬀering from a
bias. The remaining studies tested Hypothesis 3 by manipulating ac-
curacy motivation at the individual level through awareness (Study 4a),
at the interpersonal level through accountability (Study 4b), and at the
organizational level through ﬁnancial incentives (Study 4c). Study 4c
also tested Hypothesis 4 by measuring whether feedback directness
mediates the eﬀect of accuracy motivation on the illusion of transpar-
ency. We also report an internal meta-analysis of the ﬁle drawer to
provide additional conﬁdence in our eﬀects.
6. Study 1: Field study in a real-world organization
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish the occurrence of the illu-
sion of transparency in a real-world organization where feedback is
delivered in an institutionalized and regular manner. We conducted a
multi-source study for which we surveyed a sample of managers and
their respective employees about their most recent annual performance
appraisal. To do so, we compared managers’ expectations about their
employees’ understanding of the performance evaluation to employees’
actual understanding. We predicted that managers would overestimate
how accurately their feedback was perceived by their employees
(Hypothesis 1). In addition, we tested whether this gap between man-
agers and employees is more pronounced when the feedback is negative
than when it is positive (Hypothesis 2).
6.1. Methods
6.1.1. Sample and procedure
Our study was conducted at a multinational organization in the
education sector. The organization is a provider of degree programs and
executive education with locations in multiple countries. In coordina-
tion with the Human Resources (HR) department, we contacted 173
staﬀ whom the HR department identiﬁed as “managers” with a super-
visory function, as well as 566 individuals identiﬁed as “employees.”
Managers and employees were contacted separately via email by the
research team and invited to participate in a short survey on perfor-
mance appraisals. The email was distributed several weeks after the
annual completion of the annual performance appraisal within the
company and contained the link to an electronic survey. Due to the
sensitive nature of the research topic, participants were assured that
their information would remain conﬁdential and used for academic
research purposes only. After sending two additional reminders, we
achieved response rates of 35.2% for managers and 40.5% for em-
ployees. Because the purpose of the study was to assess diﬀerences in
perceptions between managers and their employees, we matched the
manager and employee responses at the dyadic level. Our ﬁnal sample
included 82 complete dyads consisting of 47 managers (mean
age = 44.98, SD= 10.24; 66.0% female) and 82 employees (mean
age = 40.99, SD= 10.39; 82.9% female).
We assessed the presence of illusory feelings of transparency by
comparing the diﬀerence between (a) the manager’s anticipation of the
employee’s understanding of the performance rating and (b) the em-
ployee’s actual understanding of the performance rating. For this, we
adapted operationalizations from past illusion of transparency research
(e.g., Keysar & Henly, 2002; Vorauer & Cameron, 2002) to our perfor-
mance appraisal context.
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6.1.2. Manager’s anticipated evaluation
Managers were asked to indicate the performance rating they an-
ticipated their employee understood based on the feedback they pro-
vided during the most recent annual performance appraisal (“What do
you think [Employee Name]’s understanding is of his or her perfor-
mance based on the annual performance feedback that you commu-
nicated?”). The anticipated performance evaluation was measured on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (extremely poor) to 7 (extremely
good).
6.1.3. Employee’s perceived evaluation
Employees were asked to indicate the performance evaluation that
they actually understood in the performance appraisal. Using the same
7-point scale (1 = extremely poor; 7 = extremely good), employees an-
swered the following question: “Indicate how you would assess your
performance based on the feedback [Manager Name] provided to you.”
6.1.4. Feedback valence
To assess the moderating eﬀect of feedback valence, we measured
managers’ actual perception of their employee’s performance (rather
than what they anticipated the employee understood). Speciﬁcally,
they responded to the following question: “Now forget about what
[Employee Name]’s understanding of the performance feedback is and
indicate what you actually think about [Employee Name]’s perfor-
mance.”We used the same 7-point scale as for the previous measures (1
= extremely poor; 7 = extremely good).
6.1.5. Control variables
To rule out other potential explanations for diﬀerences between
manager and employee ratings, we controlled for several demographic
and contextual variables. Speciﬁcally, we controlled for all participants’
age, gender, professional experience (in years), and self-reported
English language skills (1 = terrible; 5 = excellent). We also included
additional role-speciﬁc variables. Managers were asked to report their
experience in conducting performance appraisals (in years) and their
self-reported feedback-giving skills (1 = poor; 5 = excellent).
Employees indicated how thorough the feedback was (1 = not at all
thorough; 7 = very thorough) and whether the performance appraisal
was conducted in person or not (coded as 0 = face-to-face; 1 = other).
Finally, to account for the nested data structure and the repeated
measures study design, we analyzed the data in STATA using the
“xtmixed” command for multilevel linear modelling (Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). Speciﬁcally, we treated role as a repeated
measure at the dyadic level (manager vs. employee), used feedback
valence as a continuous predictor variable (ranging from negative to
positive), and modelled employees as nested in supervisors to reﬂect
that some managers evaluated multiple employees.1
6.2. Results
We ﬁrst tested Hypothesis 1, predicting that managers overestimate
how accurately their feedback came across to employees. Indeed,
managers generally anticipated that their feedback would be under-
stood by their employees more negatively (M = 5.63; SE = 0.13, CI95
= 5.38; 5.89) than employees actually understood (M = 6.04; SE =
0.13; CI95 = 5.79; 6.30), β= 0.41, z = 3.43, p= 0.001, d = 0.35 (see
Model 1 in Table 1). This eﬀect remained signiﬁcant when we included
the control variables, β = 0.37, z = 2.78, p= 0.005, d = 0.37 (see
Model 2 in Table 1).
We then tested Hypothesis 2, predicting that the diﬀerence between
managers’ predictions and employees’ actual understanding would be
larger for negative feedback than positive feedback. This is what we
found. There was a signiﬁcant interaction of role and feedback valence,
β = −0.55, z = −5.93, p < 0.001 (see Model 3 in Table 1), which
remained signiﬁcant when we added the control variables to the model,
β=−0.55, z=−6.06, p < 0.001 (see Model 4 in Table 1). To clarify
the nature of the interaction eﬀect, we conducted additional simple
eﬀects analyses, which showed that when the feedback was negative
(minus one standard deviation of feedback valence), managers’ antici-
pated feedback rating was signiﬁcantly lower (M = 4.70; SE = 0.11;
CI95 = 4.48; 4.92) than what employees actually understood (M =
5.75; SE = 0.11; CI95 = 5.52; 5.97), β= 1.05, z = 6.95, p < 0.001, d
= 0.55. However, when the feedback was positive (plus one standard
deviation of feedback valence), managers’ anticipated feedback rating
was no longer statistically diﬀerent (M= 6.55; SE= 0.11; CI95 = 6.33;
6.77) from employees’ actual understanding (M = 6.34; SE = 0.11;
CI95 = 6.11; 6.56), β=−0.22, z=−0.145, p= 0.15, d=−0.11 (see
Fig. 1).2
6.3. Discussion
Study 1 provided support for our hypotheses that managers
Table 1
Results of multilevel regression in Study 1.
Dependent variable:
performance rating
Main
eﬀect
(Model 1)
Main eﬀect
+ controls
(Model 2)
Interaction
(Model 3)
Interaction
+ controls
(Model 4)
Role (0=Manager;
1= Employee)
0.41*
(0.12)
0.37**
(0.13)
0.41***
(0.11)
0.36**
(0.11)
Feedback valence 0.80***
(0.07)
0.74***
(0.07)
Interaction (Role X
Valence)
−0.55***
(0.09)
−0.55***
(0.09)
Age 0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Gender −0.04
(0.18)
−0.13
(0.14)
English skills −0.23*
(0.11)
−0.30***
(0.08)
Professional
experience
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.01)
Manager feedback
experience
0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
Manager self-reported
feedback-giving
skills
0.33*
(0.14)
0.06
(0.09)
Employee perception
of feedback
thoroughness
0.14**
(0.05)
0.08*
(0.04)
Face-to-face delivery
(dummy)
0.14
(0.31)
0.05
(0.23)
Location dummies Included Included
Intercept 5.63**
(0.12)
4.70***
(0.77)
5.62***
(0.08)
6.10***
(0.58)
Number of clusters 47 47 47 47
Number of
observations
164 164 164 164
Wald Chi-squared
test
11.77*** 54.17*** 161.41*** 225.61***
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
1 Although one could model role as an additional level of analysis as managers and
employees are nested in dyads, this variance is already subsumed by treating role as a
repeated measure. Model ﬁt and the residual variance remained identical, irrespective of
whether dyad was included as an additional level or not.
2 Because of the multilevel structure of our data, we conducted all analysis using a
grand mean centering approach (reported in results section) and a group mean centering
approach (reported here) for feedback valence. Although both centering methods are
statistically sound methods to improve parameter estimation, statisticians are debating
which approach is preferable (Enders & Toﬁghi, 2007; Kreft, De Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995).
We report both. Our results remained signiﬁcant when we centered feedback valence
around the group mean instead (main eﬀect: ps < 0.01; interaction: ps < 0.05).
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overestimate how accurately employees understand their feedback, and
that this eﬀect is more pronounced for more negative feedback.
Although Study 1 was conducted within the context of an actual annual
performance appraisal between real managers and employees, the
correlational nature of the data does not establish a causal link between
valence and transparency illusions. The goal of Study 2 was to address
this shortcoming.
7. Study 2: Feedback valence
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the ﬁndings from the ﬁeld study
in an interactive face-to-face feedback setting using a homogenous
sample and random assignment to manager and employee roles. A
second goal was to replicate the moderating eﬀect of feedback valence
by manipulating valence rather than measuring it.
7.1. Participants and design
Two hundred eighteen undergraduate students (mean age = 19.91,
SD = 1.74; 61.47% female) at a university in the United States parti-
cipated in a laboratory study in exchange for $15. They were assigned
to one of 109 dyads where they took the role of either the manager
(feedback provider) or the employee (feedback recipient). All partici-
pants were native English speakers. Dyads were randomly assigned to
one of three conditions that varied in the valence of feedback: negative,
moderate, or positive.
One dyad was excluded from the analysis because the dependent
variable was not completed. Our analyses are based on the remaining
108 dyads.
7.2. Task and procedure
The task involved an annual performance appraisal at a consulting
agency between a manager (feedback provider) and an employee
(feedback recipient). The manager received a description of the em-
ployee’s performance in the ﬁrm and was instructed to communicate
the likelihood that the employee would get a promotion.
Feedback valence was manipulated through speciﬁc instructions
within the task such that managers had to communicate a 10% pro-
motion likelihood (negative feedback condition), a 50% promotion like-
lihood (moderate feedback condition), or a 90% promotion likelihood
(positive feedback condition). Managers were instructed to communicate
the promotion likelihood to the employees as accurately as possible
without revealing the exact promotion likelihood. Participants were
given 15 min to prepare their feedback before the meeting. The feed-
back session was conducted face-to-face.
7.3. Dependent measures
After the feedback session, both parties completed the dependent
measures in a brief questionnaire. Transparency illusions were assessed
by comparing the diﬀerence between (a) the manager’s anticipation of
the employee’s understanding of the performance rating and (b) the
employee’s actual understanding of the performance rating. We adapted
measures from past illusion of transparency research (e.g.,
Keysar & Henly, 2002; Vorauer & Cameron, 2002) to our performance
appraisal context and asked managers: “Based on the information you
conveyed in your conversation, what do you think Burke’s [Employee] un-
derstanding is of his chance of being promoted to manager at the end of next
year?” (0% = will not be promoted to manager; 100% = will deﬁnitely be
promoted to manager). Employees reported their perceived promotion
likelihood based on the manager’s feedback: “Based on the information
Stanley [Manager] conveyed in your conversation, what is the likelihood
that you will be promoted to manager at the end of next year?” (0% = will
not be promoted to manager; 100% = will deﬁnitely be promoted to
manager). Similar percentage scores are often used to operationalize
feedback valence in performance appraisal contexts (e.g.,
Benedict & Levine, 1988; Dibble & Levine, 2010).
7.4. Manipulation check
To ensure our manipulation was successful, managers were asked to
indicate the promotion likelihood they were instructed to convey to the
employees (0%= will not be promoted to manager; 100%= will deﬁnitely
be promoted to manager).
7.5. Results
7.5.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was successful. Managers in the negative feed-
back condition indicated that they had to communicate a lower per-
centage score (M = 10.57; SD = 4.16; CI95 = 9.14; 12.00) than in the
moderate condition (M = 50.91; SD = 5.22; CI95 = 49.06; 52.76) or
the positive condition (M = 84.50; SD = 17.39; CI95 = 78.94; 90.06),
all ps < 0.001. Managers in the positive condition indicated a sig-
niﬁcantly higher percentage scores than in any other condition, all
ps < 0.001.
7.5.2. Illusion of transparency
We predicted that the gap between the manager’s anticipated un-
derstanding of the employee and the employee’s actual understanding
would be stronger for negative feedback than for positive feedback. The
results support this prediction (Fig. 2). We found a marginally sig-
niﬁcant interaction eﬀect of feedback valence (between-dyad) and re-
ported performance rating by role (within-dyad), F(2,105) =
2.60, p= 0.079, η2p = 0.05. To examine the nature of this interaction,
we conducted additional simple eﬀects analyses. First, in the negative
feedback condition managers anticipated that they communicated ne-
gative feedback more negatively (M = 37.35; SD = 23.04; CI95 =
30.74; 43.96) than was actually understood by employees (M = 50.88;
SD = 28.75; CI95 = 43.35; 58.42), F(1,105) = 9.27, p= 0.003, d =
0.83. Second, a marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found in the
moderate feedback condition where managers’ anticipation (M =
65.15; SD = 17.30; CI95 = 58.44; 71.86) was lower than the em-
ployees’ understanding (M= 72.82; SD= 18.20; CI95 = 65.17; 80.47),
F(1,105) = 2.89, p= 0.09, d = 0.39. Third, in the positive feedback
condition there was no longer a diﬀerence between managers (M =
80.12; SD = 17.73; CI95 = 74.10; 86.14) and employees (M = 80.05;
Fig. 1. Anticipated performance rating by managers and actual understanding by em-
ployees in Study 1. Performance ratings ranged from 1 to 10. Error bars indicate± 1 SEM.
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SD = 18.51; CI95 = 73.19; 86.91), F(1,105) = 0.00, p= 0.98, d =
−0.05.
We also analyzed whether the diﬀerence between managers’ and
employees’ scores varied between conditions. We found that the dif-
ference between the managers’ anticipation and employees’ actual un-
derstanding was greater for negative feedback (M = 13.53; SD =
32.53; CI95 = 2.18; 24.88) than for positive feedback (M =−0.07; SD
= 20.61; CI95 =−6.58; 6.43), F(1,105) = 5.12, p= 0.026, d = 0.50.
The diﬀerence between manager and employee in the moderate feed-
back condition (M = 7.67; SD = 24.10; CI95 = −0.88; 4.20) did not
diﬀer from the negative or positive conditions (ps > 0.26). We
achieved a statistical power of 0.96 for the test of our main prediction
(attenuated interaction).
7.6. Discussion
Study 2 replicates the main and interaction eﬀects documented in
the ﬁeld (Study 1) using a homogenous participant sample and random
assignment to conditions. Managers overestimated how accurately they
communicated their feedback to employees, and this eﬀect was more
pronounced for more negative feedback. Our next study tested the ro-
bustness of these ﬁndings using a yoked observer design to rule out a
potential bias on the employee side.
8. Study 3: Third party observers
The goal of Study 3 was to rule out the possibility that the eﬀect in
the previous studies was driven by the employees’ need for positive self-
regard. Because people have an innate need to view themselves in a
positive light, which can be vital for the maintenance of self-esteem and
mental health (e.g., Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995;
Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988), feedback receivers may selec-
tively seek information that conﬁrms their positive self-views, leading
to positive illusions of the self (e.g., Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985;
Robins & Beer, 2001). In addition, the recipients’ interpretation of self-
relevant performance feedback may have been more optimistic than the
provider’s interpretation due to social desirability concerns
(Krizan &Windschitl, 2007). To test these alternative accounts, Study 3
paired each dyad with an observer who observed the feedback delivery,
received the same instructions as the manager, and had no reason to
perceive feedback more positively than it was communicated. If the
discrepancy between the manager rating and the employee rating was
driven by a self-serving bias of the employee, then the observer would
report the same rating as the manager. Conversely, if the misperception
in the message received is driven by the manager anchoring on their
own thoughts and insuﬃciently adjusting for the perspective of the
receiver, as we argue here, then the observer’s understanding of the
feedback would be the similar to the employee’s rating.
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Participants and design
Forty-four professionals (mean age = 28, 34% female) enrolled in
an MBA program at a U.S. business school were assigned to one of 22
dyads and were randomly assigned the role of either a manager
(feedback provider) or an employee (feedback recipient) as part of a
class exercise. All participants were native English speakers.
In addition, 16 undergraduate students of the same university par-
ticipated as observers and were paid $8.00 for their participation.
Because six feedback sessions were not video recorded due to techno-
logical failures, only 16 dyads could be matched with an observer.3
8.1.2. Task
The role-play took place during the feedback session of an in-
troductory leadership class and involved an advertisement project that
was completed by the employee and subsequently evaluated by the
managers. The manager’s information contained a description of the
employee’s performance on this project. Most importantly, managers
were told to convey to the employee that they had a 10% chance of
being promoted to Brand Manager within the next six months, without
mentioning the actual percentage.
8.1.3. Procedure
MBA participants were told that they would be assigned to the role
of either a manager or an employee in a performance feedback meeting.
Managers were instructed to communicate the employee’s past perfor-
mance and promotion likelihood.
Participants had 15 min to prepare and take notes. To prevent them
from simply reading aloud the information that they were given, par-
ticipants could not use their role materials during the feedback session.
After reading the instructions, the dyads went to separate breakout
rooms to conduct the feedback session face-to-face. Video cameras were
set up in each breakout room to record the interaction.
Participants assigned to the role of informed observers were given
the manager’s role materials and instructed to read them carefully.
They were then brought to separate breakout rooms to watch the vi-
deotaped feedback meeting to which they were randomly assigned.
8.1.4. Dependent measures
After the feedback session, both parties completed the same de-
pendent measures as in Study 2. To test whether the eﬀect was driven
by the employee rather than the manager, we also asked the observers
to indicate what chance they thought the employee perceived s/he had
of being promoted based on the feedback the manager provided.
8.2. Results
The results depicted in Fig. 3 show that managers thought that they
had communicated negative feedback more negatively than employees
actually understood (Hypothesis 1). Speciﬁcally, managers anticipated
that their feedback delivery was more negative (M = 31.64; SD =
18.86; CI95 = 23.28; 40.00) than it was actually perceived by the
employees (M = 62.73; SD = 27.24; CI95 = 50.65; 74.81), F(1,21) =
15.04, p < 0.001, d = 0.96.4 The test of our main prediction (mean
diﬀerence between manager and employee score) achieved a statistical
power of 0.99.
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Fig. 2. Anticipated and actual understanding of employee performance rating by feed-
back valence in Study 2. Likelihood scale ranged from 0 to 100. Error bars indicate±1
SEM.
3 The direction and signiﬁcance of the manager-employee results remain identical ir-
respective of whether all 22 dyads were analyzed or only the 16 that could be recorded.
4 Identical patterns emerged when we only analyzed those dyads that could be matched
with an observer (MManager = 28.43; SDManager = 17.49; MEmployee = 60.63; SDEmployee =
30.38), F(1,15) = 10.72, p= 0.005, d = 0.86.
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We predicted no diﬀerence between the employees’ and the fully
informed observers’ understanding of the feedback. Indeed, observers’
understanding of the feedback (M= 51.19; SD = 24.31; CI95 = 38.23;
64.14) was higher than what manager anticipated, F(1,15) =
7.95, p= 0.013, d = 0.75, but similar to the employees’ under-
standing, F(1,15) = 1.35, p= 0.26, d = 0.19.
8.3. Discussion
Study 3 again showed that managers overestimated the extent to
which the negativity of their feedback was as apparent to employees.
Importantly, the inclusion of informed observers also showed that this
eﬀect is unlikely driven by self-view maintenance and social desirability
concerns on the employee-side.
Our remaining studies focus on why transparency illusions emerge
when feedback is negative. We predicted that managers suﬀer from
transparency illusions because they are insuﬃciently motivated to be
accurate. To test this mechanism, we used a moderation-by-process
approach (Spencer et al., 2005) and manipulated managers’ accuracy
motivation at the intrapersonal (Study 4a), interpersonal (Study 4b), and
organizational level (Study 4c).
9. Study 4a: Intrapersonal awareness
Study 4a manipulated accuracy motivation at the intrapersonal
level. One potentially powerful way to do so is by informing managers
that they are likely to overestimate the accuracy with which they
communicate their intentions to others. Indeed, making individuals
aware that their judgments and behavior may be biased often serves as
an impetus to set corrective actions in motion (Strack &Hannover,
1996). For example, Fischhoﬀ (1982) proposed that bias can be reduced
or even eliminated when people receive feedback about the possibility
of bias. Accordingly, managers should be less likely to suﬀer from
transparency illusions and communicate feedback more veridically
when they are made aware of this unintentional bias than when they
are not. We predict that the gap between managers’ anticipated and
employees’ actual understanding is reduced when managers are told
that they may not communicate their feedback as clearly as they think.
9.1. Method
9.1.1. Participants and design
For the manager role, we recruited 117 MBA students at an
international business school (mean age = 28.97, SD = 2.25; 22.9%
female) who completed a study in exchange for the chance to win one
of six bottles of champagne. For the employee role, we recruited par-
ticipants from Mechanical Turk (mean age = 33.09, SD = 10.57;
52.5% female) in exchange for $0.70. Dyads consisting of a manager
and an employee were then randomly assigned to a control condition or
an intrapersonal awareness condition.
Sample size was determined in advance based on the eﬀect size
achieved in a pretest and expected response rate. Four dyads were ex-
cluded because managers did not give feedback to the employees as
instructed (e.g., merely told the employee to meet them in the oﬃce),
leaving a total of 113 dyads.5
9.1.2. Task and procedure
All participants were told to imagine that they were working at a
multinational company producing luxury goods and that managers
would give feedback to their subordinates. The feedback task involved
an annual performance review and evaluated three speciﬁc skills, in-
cluding the employee’s analytical ability, communication skills, and
teamwork abilities. Each of the three skills was assessed on a Likert
scale from 1 (Poor) to 10 (Excellent) and reﬂected an overall perfor-
mance rating of 2 out of 10 (analytical ability: 2 out of 10; commu-
nication skills: 3 out of 10; teamwork abilities: 1 out of 10). This in-
formation was only available to the manager. Similar performance
dimensions and scales have been used in the past (e.g., Gordon, 1972;
Waung &Highhouse, 1997). The negative feedback was delivered in a
two-stage process in which the participants assigned to the manager
role were asked to send an email to their subordinate (Stage 1) and
participants assigned to the employee role were then asked to read and
evaluate this email (Stage 2).
9.1.2.1. Stage 1. Participants in the manager role were instructed to
write an email to one of their subordinates, outlining the performance
observed during the past year. For each of the three performance
dimensions (analytical ability, communication skills, teamwork
abilities) managers were provided with ﬁctitious notes that they had
allegedly taken during the past year (e.g., “Doesn’t always structure
information eﬀectively”, “Finds communicating problems diﬃcult”;
“Doesn’t help out others a lot”). Managers were instructed to
communicate the feedback such that it would reﬂect the exact
numerical rating for each of the skills, but were also instructed not to
reveal the numerical rating to the employee.6 After they submitted their
email, managers were asked to complete the dependent measures and
provide demographic information about their age, gender, supervisory
experience (in years), and the number of performance appraisals they
conducted in the past 12 months.
9.1.2.2. Stage 2. Upon completion of the ﬁrst stage, we randomly
assigned the managers’ emails to a non-overlapping sample of
participants (“the employees”). Employees were told that they would
receive their annual performance feedback from their supervisor via
email. Each employee received one email. They were asked to carefully
read the email from their supervisor and subsequently completed the
dependent measures and demographic questions.7
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Fig. 3. Anticipated and actual understanding of employee promotion likelihood in Study
3. Likelihood scale ranged from 0 to 100. Error bars indicate±1 SEM.
5 The predicted attenuated interaction remained signiﬁcant when all dyads were
analyzed, F(1,115) = 8.25, p = 0.041, η2p = 0.04.
6 For this and all other online studies, we made sure that none of the managers’ mes-
sages revealed the actual rating to the employee.
7 We also conducted a pilot study with experienced managers (N= 100) who conduct
performance appraisals on a regular basis as well as a direct replication with online
participants (N= 200) to test our performance appraisal task. We found that managers
suﬀered from transparency illusions even when they had extensive feedback experience (p
= 0.005) and when they were able to reveal the actual ratings to the employee (p =
0.006). See Supplemental Online Materials for study designs and detailed results.
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9.1.3. Intrapersonal awareness manipulation
To manipulate accuracy motivation at the individual level, man-
agers in the intrapersonal awareness condition were exposed to an addi-
tional page of instructions before they wrote their message. The in-
structions read:
Based on your past experience with giving feedback to others, you
feel that the evaluations you are going to communicate today will
not be evident to the employee. Thus, the employee is unlikely to see
the evaluation the same way as you do and will not be able to clearly
understand your feedback.
Managers in the control condition received no additional instructions
before they communicated their feedback to the employee.
9.1.4. Dependent measures
We assessed the presence of illusory feelings of transparency by
comparing the diﬀerence between (a) the manager’s anticipation of the
employee’s understanding of the performance rating and (b) the em-
ployee’s actual understanding of the performance rating. Speciﬁcally,
managers were asked to answer the question “Based on the information
you conveyed in your feedback, what do you think the feedback recipient’s
understanding is of what performance rating s/he will get from you?” (1 =
Poor; 10 = Excellent) for each of the three skills. Employees answered
the question “Based on the information conveyed in the email, what per-
formance rating do you expect?” for each of the three skills (1 = Poor; 10
= Excellent). We collapsed the individual skill measures to an overall
performance measure for both managers (α = 0.76) and employees (α
= 0.82).
9.2. Results
We predicted that the illusion of transparency would emerge in the
control condition but would be absent in the intrapersonal awareness
condition (Hypothesis 3). This is exactly what we found (see Fig. 4).
There was a signiﬁcant interaction of the awareness manipulation
(between-dyad) and the reported performance rating by role (within-
dyad), F(1,111) = 4.45, p= 0.037, η2p = 0.04. More speciﬁcally,
managers in the control condition anticipated that they communicated
the employee’s overall performance more negatively
(M= 3.57, SD= 0.98; CI95 = 3.30; 3.85) than the employees actually
understood (M= 4.18, SD= 1.86; CI95 = 3.72; 4.64), F(1,111) =
5.67, p= 0.019, d = 0.30. However, managers’ anticipation
(M= 3.98, SD= 1.22; CI95 = 3.68; 4.28) and employees’ actual per-
ception (M= 3.80, SD= 1.75; CI95 = 3.30; 4.29) were no longer dif-
ferent in the intrapersonal awareness condition, F(1,111) =
0.45, p= 0.50, d = 0.09. In addition, making managers aware of bias
led to an increase in managers’ rating, F(1,111) = 3.87, p= 0.052, d
= 0.37, and a directional decrease in employees’ ratings, F(1,111) =
1.27, p= 0.26, d = 0.21. For the test of our primary prediction (atte-
nuated interaction), we achieved a statistical power of 0.90.
9.3. Discussion
Study 4a supported Hypothesis 3, showing that managers’ trans-
parency illusions were reduced when accuracy motivation was in-
creased by making them aware that their feedback would not be as
evident as they thought. Study 4a also showed that although the re-
duced transparency illusion in the awareness condition was a combi-
nation of a higher manager rating and lower employee rating, the
correction on the manager side contributed relatively more to the in-
teraction eﬀect. It is possible that managers were somehow aware that
they might overestimate how negatively their feedback would come
across and corrected their bias primarily by adjusting their anticipated
rating. The slight change in what managers communicated in the
awareness condition may have occurred because (a) it is easier to adjust
one’s own anticipated rating than to give more candid feedback and (b)
managers were not accountable for delivering the instructed perfor-
mance rating accurately. The remaining two studies address this issue
by holding managers directly accountable for the accuracy of their
feedback at the interpersonal level (Study 4b) and at the organizational
level (Study 4c). Thus, we expect to observe a signiﬁcant correction on
the employee side and not the manager side.
10. Study 4b: Interpersonal accountability
Study 4b manipulated accuracy motivation at the interpersonal
level by making managers more accountable. Accountability generally
implies that an individual’s decisions and actions are monitored and
evaluated by others (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). When people feel that
they are accountable to someone else, they are more likely to engage in
self-critical and eﬀortful thinking (Chaiken, 1980), are more aware of
their own judgment processes (Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), and are
more likely to calibrate for their natural overconﬁdence in their own
actions (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). For example, accountability has led to
increased interview validity (Brtek &Motowidlo, 2002) and more at-
tentive and accurate coding of another participant’s task performance
(Mero &Motowidlo, 1995). Thus, Study 4b aimed to test whether
managerial accountability would reduce their transparency illusions.
Study 4b also aimed to examine whether accountability could be
manipulated interpersonally. Most studies on accountability use exo-
genous, experimenter-induced manipulations (e.g., by telling partici-
pants that they will have to justify their responses to the experimenter
after the study; see Pitesa & Thau, 2013). These manipulations do not
reﬂect the social dynamics within organizations. Because being ac-
countable not only means that one’s actions are monitored by an or-
ganization but also that one is obligated to someone else (see
Brtek &Motowidlo, 2002; London, Smither, & Adsit, 1997), an em-
ployee should be able to evoke a feeling of accountability in a manager.
Thus, we tested whether receiving an explicit employee request for
accurate feedback would reduce managers’ transparency illusions. We
predicted that the transparency illusions decrease when managers re-
ceive an explicit request from the employee to deliver their feedback as
accurately as possible.
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Fig. 4. Anticipated and actual understanding of employee performance rating by ex-
perimental condition in Study 4a. Performance rating scale ranged from 1 to 10. Error
bars indicate± 1 SEM.
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10.1. Method
10.1.1. Participants and design
We recruited 208 participants from Mechanical Turk (mean age =
34.77, SD = 10.99; 44.2% female) in exchange for $1.50 (manager
role) or $0.70 (employee role). Payment amounts were determined
according to study length. The 104 dyads were randomly assigned to a
control condition or an interpersonal accountability condition.
Sample size was determined in advance based on the eﬀect size
achieved in a pretest. Six dyads were excluded because managers did
not give feedback to the employees as instructed (e.g., wrote about
something unrelated to the task), leaving a total of 98 dyads.8
10.1.2. Task and procedure
The task and procedure was identical to Study 4a.
10.1.3. Interpersonal accountability manipulation
To manipulate interpersonal accountability, managers received
diﬀerent messages from the employee to which they would later give
feedback. Managers in the control condition received a message stating:
“Hello, I just wanted to say that I am looking forward to receiving your
feedback. Thank you.” The message to managers in the interpersonal
accountability condition was identical but contained an additional mes-
sage which read “Could you please communicate your feedback re-
garding my performance during the past year as accurately as possible?
I would like to understand your assessment of my performance during
the past year as accurately as possible.”
10.1.4. Dependent measures
The illusion of transparency measure was identical to Study 4a. We
collapsed the individual skill measures to an overall performance
measure for both managers (α = 0.87) and employees (α = 0.77).
10.1.5. Manipulation check
To check the eﬀectiveness of the manipulation, managers indicated
(1) the extent to which the employee asked them to communicate the
feedback as accurately as possible and (2) how important it was for the
employee to understand the manager’s assessment as accurately as
possible (1 = Not at all; 7 = To a great extent; α = 0.56).9
10.2. Results
10.2.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was eﬀective. Managers in the accountability
condition indicated that employees wanted more accurate feedback
(M= 6.81, SD= 0.45) than in the control condition
(M= 4.16, SD= 1.19), F(1,96) = 211.70, p < 0.001.
10.2.2. Illusion of transparency
We then tested our main prediction that the illusion of transparency
would be present in the control condition but not in the interpersonal
accountability condition. The patterns in Fig. 5 support this prediction.
We observed a signiﬁcant interaction of the interpersonal account-
ability manipulation (between-dyad) and the reported performance
rating by role (within-dyad), F(1,96) = 6.34, p= 0.012, η2p = 0.07.
Speciﬁcally, managers in the control condition anticipated that they
communicated the employee’s overall performance more negatively
(M= 3.05, SD= 1.63; CI95 = 2.56; 3.55) than the employees actually
understood (M= 4.66, SD= 1.77; CI95 = 4.21; 5.12), F(1,96) =
27.06, p < 0.001, d = 0.74. However, managers’ anticipation
(M= 3.25, SD= 1.87; CI95 = 2.75; 3.75) and employees’ actual per-
ception (M= 3.73, SD= 1.41; CI95 = 3.28; 4.19) were no longer sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent in the interpersonal accountability condition, F(1,
96) = 2.43, p= 0.12, d = 0.22. In addition, the accountability ma-
nipulation led to a signiﬁcant reduction of employee ratings, F(1,96) =
8.31, p= 0.005, d = 0.58, but did not aﬀect manager ratings, F(1,96)
= 0.31, p= 0.58, d = 0.11. For the test of our primary prediction
(attenuated interaction), we achieved a statistical power of 0.99.
10.3. Discussion
Study 4b showed that managers no longer suﬀered from transpar-
ency illusions when we activated their accuracy motivation through
employee request for accurate feedback. In contrast to Study 4a, how-
ever, the bias correction occurred on the employee side while manager
ratings were unaﬀected by the accountability manipulation. This is
consistent with our earlier interpretation that managers in Study 4a
may not have felt a suﬃcient sense of accountability to deliver their
feedback more negatively and instead corrected their own rating.
Overall, this study provides further support for the idea that a lack of
accuracy motivation is responsible for the gap between managers and
employees (Hypothesis 3).
11. Study 4c: Organizational incentives and the mediating role of
communication directness
The ﬁnal study manipulated accuracy motivation at the organiza-
tional level through incentives because ﬁrms can use these to direct the
actions of their workforce (Gerhart & Fang, 2015; Lawler, 1981). For
example, oﬀering participants performance-contingent incentives can
trigger systematic and deliberate decision-making (Stone & Ziebart,
1995) and can reduce the impact of cognitive biases (e.g., Simmons
et al., 2010). The pervasive impact of ﬁnancial incentives on peoples’
decision-making tendencies implies that they may be an eﬀective means
to enhance managers’ accuracy motivation. Thus, we predicted that
making managers’ ﬁnancial compensation contingent on the accuracy
with which they communicate the negative feedback to their employees
would reduce their transparency illusions.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Control  
condition 
Interpersonal 
accountability condition 
Manager anticipated 
Employee perceived 
Fig. 5. Anticipated and actual understanding of employee performance rating by ex-
perimental condition in Study 4b. Performance rating scale ranged from 1 to 10. Error
bars indicate±1 SEM.
8 The predicted attenuated interaction remained signiﬁcant when all dyads were
analyzed, F(1,115) = 4.50, p = 0.036, η2p = 0.04.
9 The low reliability coeﬃcient is likely a reﬂection of the fact that the second item
(i.e., how important it was for the employee to understand the manager’s assessment as
accurately as possible) was less sensitive to the manipulation as most managers generally
agreed that it is important for employees to have an accurate understanding of their
performance. Nevertheless, both manipulation check items were signiﬁcant in the pre-
dicted direction when analyzed independently (ps < 0.001).
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An additional goal of Study 4c was to examine why increased ac-
curacy motivation would reduce transparency illusions. According to
our theory, increased accuracy motivation should cause managers to
recognize that their intentions may not be fully apparent to their em-
ployees and, as a consequence, communicate more their feedback more
directly by rephrasing or clarifying more what they mean (Hypothesis
4).
A ﬁnal goal of this study was to test whether the eﬀects documented
in the previous experiments would hold when managers anticipated an
ongoing relationship with employees. Although Study 1 established the
presence of the illusion of transparency in a real organization where
managers and employees share a common past and future, Study 4c
made this contextual feature more explicit in an experimental context
by instructing all managers to expect ongoing interaction with the
employee.
11.1. Method
11.1.1. Participants and design
For the manager role, we recruited 105 participants from Proliﬁc
Academic (www.proliﬁc.ac), an online participant pool maintained by
the University of Oxford. All participants (mean age = 32.69, SD =
10.94; 49.5% female, 1.4% not reported) were residents of an English-
speaking country (e.g., United Kingdom, United States, Canada) and
reported English as their ﬁrst language. Participants were paid $1.50
(manager role). For the employee role, we recruited a larger sample of
1,000 participants from Mechanical Turk (mean age = 36.69, SD =
25.85; 51.1% female) who were paid $0.30 for their participation. We
used a larger sample for employees to reliably detect qualitative dif-
ferences in managers’ feedback directness across conditions. Each
manager feedback was read and evaluated by an average of 9.5 em-
ployees (min = 7; max = 11).
Sample size was determined in advance based on the eﬀect size
achieved in a pretest. Eight manager observations were excluded be-
cause managers did not give feedback to the employees as instructed
(e.g., wrote about something unrelated to the task), leaving a total of 97
manager observations and 924 employee observations.10
11.1.2. Task and procedure
The task and procedure was identical to Studies 4a and 4b. To
further increase external validity, we explicitly told managers that they
were in the middle of a long-term project and that the employee would
continue to stay for the second half of the project. Thus, all managers
were instructed to anticipate an ongoing relationship with each other
(see also San Martin, Swaab, Sinaceur, & Vasiljevic, 2015).
11.1.3. Organizational incentives manipulation
To manipulate incentives, managers in the organizational incentives
condition were told that they could earn a bonus of $10 if the employee
would be able to accurately estimate the exact performance rating (2
out of 10) purely based on the information conveyed in their written
feedback. Managers in the control condition received no additional in-
structions or ﬁnancial incentives.
11.2. Dependent measures
11.2.1. Performance rating
In order to make it feasible for managers to achieve the bonus, we
simpliﬁed the dependent measure to a single overall performance
measure, replacing the 3-item composite measure from the previous
studies. Thus, managers reported their anticipated rating and
employees their perceived rating on a single 10-point scale (1 = Poor
overall performance; 10 = Excellent overall performance).
11.2.2. Communication directness
Based on prior research (Liu, Chua, & Stahl, 2010; Niemann, Wisse,
Rus, Van Yperen, & Sassenberg, 2014; Park et al., 2012), we measured
communication directness using ﬁve items anchored on a scale ranging
from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Speciﬁcally, employees
indicated to what extent the feedback they received was direct, up-
front, straightforward, open, and frank (α = 0.91). A factor analysis
conﬁrmed that all items loaded highly on a single factor.
11.2.3. Manipulation check
Participants in the manager role also indicated on two items 1) the
extent to which their payment depended on the accuracy of their
feedback and 2) the extent to which they were promised ﬁnancial in-
centives to communicate their feedback as accurately as possible (1 =
Not at all; 7 = To a great extent; α = 0.78).
11.3. Results
11.3.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was eﬀective. Managers in the incentives condi-
tion perceived their payment to be more dependent on accuracy
(M= 5.49, SD= 1.50, CI95 = 5.06; 5.92) than those in the control
condition (M= 3.02, SD= 1.87, CI95 = 2.47; 3.56), F(1,95) = 51.72,
p < 0.001.11
11.3.2. Illusion of transparency
We then tested our main prediction that the illusion of transparency
would be present in the control condition but not in the incentives
condition. Because employee observations were nested in manager
observations (i.e., each manager feedback was received by multiple
employees) and our study design included repeated measures at the
dyadic level, we analyzed the data in STATA using the “xtmixed”
command for multilevel linear modelling (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal,
2008).
The patterns in Fig. 6 support our prediction. There was a signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀect of the incentives manipulation (between-dyad) and
the reported performance rating by role (within-dyad), β=−0.62, z=
−4.32, p < 0.001. More speciﬁcally, managers in the control condi-
tion anticipated that they communicated the employee’s overall per-
formance more negatively (M= 3.99, SE= 0.18, CI95 = 3.63; 4.34)
than the employees actually understood (M= 4.65, SE= 0.18,
CI95 = 4.29; 5.00), β= 0.66, z= 6.39 p < 0.001, d= 0.30. However,
managers’ anticipation (M= 3.11, SE= 0.18, CI95 = 2.76; 3.44) and
employees’ actual perception (M= 3.14, SE= 0.18, CI95 = 2.80; 3.49)
were no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when managers’ ﬁnancial com-
pensation was contingent on feedback accuracy, β= 0.04, z= 0.44,
p= 0.66, d= 0.02. In addition, both the ratings provided by the
managers, β=−0.88, z=−3.50, p < 0.001, d= 0.16, and those
provided by the employees, β=−1.50, z=−5.93, p < 0.001,
d= 0.28, were lower in the incentive condition than in the control
condition, suggesting that incentives not only eliminated the illusion of
transparency but also generally led to more accurate feedback scores.
For the test of our primary prediction (attenuated interaction), we
achieved a statistical power of 0.99.
11.3.3. Communication directness
As predicted, we also found that the feedback was perceived as more
direct by the employees in the incentives condition
(M= 4.36, SE= 0.04, CI95 = 4.29; 4.43) compared to the control
10 The predicted attenuated interaction remained signiﬁcant when all dyads were
analyzed, β=−0.58, z=−4.15, p < 0.001. The mediation by feedback directness also
remained signiﬁcant, CI95 [−0.1379; −0.0234].
11 The two manipulation check items were also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across conditions
when analyzed independently (ps < 0.001).
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condition (M= 4.21, SE= 0.04, CI95 = 4.13; 4.29), β= 0.15,
z= 2.68, p= 0.007, d= 0.17.
11.3.4. Mediation analysis
To test whether the eﬀect of incentives on managers’ transparency
illusions was driven by more direct communication (Hypothesis 4), we
conducted a multilevel mediation analysis using STATA’s “ml_media-
tion” command recommended by Krull and MacKinnon (2001). We
used condition as the independent variable (0 = control condition;
1 = incentive condition), communication directness as the mediator,
and the diﬀerence score between manager and employee ratings (i.e.,
employee rating minus manager rating) as the dependent variable.
There was a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect (5000 iterations) from condition
to the diﬀerence score via communication directness, CI95 [−0.0932;
−0.0042]. We also found a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect when we used the
employee rating as the dependent variable instead of the manager-
employee diﬀerence score, CI95 [−0.0812; −0.0024]. Thus, accuracy
incentives reduced transparency illusions because they encouraged
managers to communicate their feedback more directly.
We also explored an alternative explanation that accuracy in-
centives would have led managers to simply provide more feedback. To
test this account, we repeated the mediation analysis using the amount
of words managers used in their written feedback as the mediator.
However, no support was found for the mediating eﬀect of word count,
CI95 [−0.0716; +0.1677].
11.4. Discussion
Study 4c provides additional evidence to support Hypotheses 1 and
3 by showing that managers no longer suﬀered from transparency il-
lusions when their bonus was contingent on the accuracy of their
feedback. In addition, Study 4c demonstrated that this eﬀect emerged
because managers communicated more directly (Hypothesis 4), and not
because they simply communicated more. Finally, the study showed
that the eﬀect persisted even when managers were explicitly instructed
to expect an ongoing relationship with the employee.
11.5. Internal meta-analysis
To demonstrate the robustness of the illusion of transparency and to
obtain a better estimate of the true eﬀect size free of publication bias we
conducted an internal meta-analysis including 11 studies from the ﬁle
drawer (Cumming, 2014; Tuk, Zhang, & Sweldens, 2015). We found a
moderate and signiﬁcant main eﬀect across all baseline conditions,
d= 0.44, 95% CI [0.36, 0.52], Z= 10.71, p < 0.001, and a signiﬁcant
reduction of the eﬀect size in the intervention conditions, Q(1) = 8.78,
p= 0.003 (see Supplemental Online Materials for additional analyses).
12. General discussion
Existing research on performance appraisals provides re-
commendations for how managers can reduce the inﬂation of negative
feedback (e.g., Fisher, 1979; Ilgen et al., 1979; Larson, 1986;
Sussman & Sproull, 1999; Waung &Highhouse, 1997). This research
assumes that feedback inﬂation is largely intentional, such that it re-
quires awareness and deliberate action of the provider. Accordingly,
feedback interventions with the goal of alleviating this inﬂation have
primarily targeted the intentional aspect, for example by helping
managers to feel more comfortable about giving negative feedback
(Sussman & Sproull, 1999). Yet, research showing that people’s cogni-
tive biases have a pervasive impact and distort the communication
process unconsciously (e.g., Keysar & Henly, 2002) suggests that some
feedback inﬂation may be unintentional and thus additional or diﬀerent
interventions might be needed to strengthen feedback practices. Indeed,
our studies consistently demonstrate that feedback inﬂation can occur
due to an unintentional cognitive bias causing managers to over-
estimate the extent to which employees understand the negative feed-
back they intended to provide. We also revealed that this illusion of
transparency can be reduced by making managers aware of this bias
and by motivating managers to provide accurate feedback.
The studies designed to test our hypotheses have several strengths.
Study 1 established the presence of the illusion of transparency in a real
organization and showed that this bias is particularly pronounced for
negative feedback. Study 2 replicated these eﬀects using a homogenous
participant sample and random assignment to conditions. Study 3 fur-
ther established the robustness of these ﬁndings and showed that these
eﬀects are unlikely driven by self-view maintenance and social desir-
ability concerns of the employee. Studies 4a, 4b, and 4c provided in-
sight into managers’ accuracy motivation as a mechanism. Speciﬁcally,
they showed that managers’ accuracy motivation could be activated by
making them aware of their bias (Study 4a), through explicit employee
requests for accurate feedback (Study 4b), and by making managers’
incentives contingent on the accurate delivery of their feedback (Study
4c), and that doing so reduced their transparency illusions. Study 4c
further established that the illusion of transparency is more likely to
occur when feedback is provided with more indirect statements than
with more direct messages. Overall, the results of our studies converge
to show that managers suﬀer from transparency illusions, why this
happens, and what managers, employees, and organizations can do to
reduce such unintentional feedback inﬂation.
12.1. Theoretical contributions
12.1.1. Feedback inﬂation can be unintentional
The current studies contribute to and extend the feedback literature
in a number of important ways. First, we demonstrate that the illusion
of transparency is a pervasive bias that aﬀects the accuracy with which
feedback is delivered. This ﬁnding echoes various surveys and research
reports that continue to show that managers consistently fail to com-
municate performance feedback clearly (Bloom&Van Reenen, 2010;
Cannon &Witherspoon, 2005; Manzoni, 2002), and that this failure
constitutes a major source of frustration in performance management
according to HR professionals and employees (Mercer, 2013; SHRM,
2014). Introducing the illusion of transparency to the feedback litera-
ture is also an important contribution because it can help to account for
unexplained variance in the miscommunication of performance feed-
back. Past research has primarily focused on rater intentions (see
DeNisi & Smith, 2014) and relied on the assumption that feedback
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Fig. 6. Anticipated and actual understanding of employee performance rating by ex-
perimental condition in Study 4c. Performance rating scale ranged from 1 to 10. Error
bars indicate± 1 SEM.
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providers have full control over what is being communicated and that
what is being said reﬂects the provider’s intention (e.g.,
Benedict & Levine, 1988; Bond & Anderson, 1987; Fang,
Kim, &Milliken, 2014; Sussman & Sproull, 1999; Waung &Highhouse,
1997). Complementing this view, we show that managers suﬀer from
unintentional biases when they communicate negative feedback. In
other words, managers’ intentions may not always be fully reﬂected in
the transmitted feedback because they might not be aware that the
information that they are communicating is not evident to the em-
ployee.
A question naturally following from our studies pertains to the re-
lationship between intentional and unintentional feedback inﬂation
and the conditions under which each of them emerges. According to
past research, intentional feedback inﬂation is driven by the feedback
provider’s need to avoid retaliation and emotional harm (e.g., Fisher,
1979; Waung &Highhouse, 1997). Such tendencies are likely more
pronounced for individuals who have a low tolerance for conﬂict
(Bond & Anderson, 1987) or a high concern for others
(Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013; Van Lange, 1999). Intentional feedback in-
ﬂation may also be fueled by interpersonal and contextual factors such
as social distance (Weenig, Groenenboom, &Wilke, 2001), richness of
the communication medium (Waung &Highhouse, 1997), or the extent
to which organizational culture allows for open communication
(Anicich, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). In contrast, unintentional feedback
inﬂation can be explained by heuristic thinking and a lack of cognitive
resources. The extent to which people suﬀer from cognitive biases, such
as the illusion of transparency, may thus be aﬀected by individual
diﬀerences such as need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty,
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and domain-relevant expertise (Loschelder,
Friese, Schaerer, & Galinsky, 2016; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke,
1996), or the extent to which organizational contexts are characterized
by high attentional demands (see also Schaerer, Lee, Galinsky, & Thau,
2018). Although these factors may either inﬂuence intentional or un-
intentional feedback inﬂation, other factors may aﬀect both types of
inﬂation. For example, feedback providers who are high on agree-
ableness may be more likely to avoid interpersonal conﬂict
(Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997; Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001) and
be more susceptible to anchoring biases (Eroglu & Croxton, 2010). Si-
milarly, feedback valence aﬀects both types of feedback inﬂation as
people are more reluctant to share negative than positive information
(Dibble & Levine, 2010) and that transparency illusions are more pro-
nounced when feedback is negative rather than positive (see Studies
1–2). Finally, Study 4c demonstrated that providing incentives led to a
reduction of both intentional and unintentional feedback inﬂation.
Future research may investigate the antecedents and relative inﬂuence
of intentional and unintentional feedback inﬂation more systematically.
12.1.2. Elucidating the mechanism underlying transparency illusions
The present research also contributes to our understanding of the
illusion of transparency (e.g., Cameron & Vorauer, 2008;
Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Gilovich et al., 1998) by identifying and
testing an underlying mechanism. Although past research has estab-
lished the presence of the illusion of transparency in a number of dif-
ferent settings, it did not provide a nuanced test of the mechanisms
underlying the illusion. The present theory and empirical support
provide a clear answer to the call by Gilovich et al. (1998) by showing
that the illusion of transparency is driven by a lack of deliberate
thinking and that motivating senders to be accurate communicators
counteracts this unintentional bias. Our focus on performance feedback
settings, which allowed for interaction between a provider (i.e., man-
ager) and a recipient (i.e., employee), is also an important contribution
to the illusion of transparency literature because prior research relied
predominantly on context-deprived settings without any interaction
between the target of the illusion and the respective audience (e.g.,
Gilovich et al., 1998; Keysar, 1994; Keysar & Henly, 2002; Newton,
1990, for an exception see Van Boven, Gilovich, &Medvec, 2003),
leaving it unclear as to whether transparency illusions also extend to
interactive settings.
12.1.3. Increasing the external validity of accuracy motivation research
Finally, our results are relevant for research on accuracy motivation.
We show that accuracy motivation is an important construct that ap-
plies to rich interactive feedback settings in organizations and not just
context-deprived judgment and decision-making tasks (e.g.,
Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Simmons et al., 2010; Thompson et al.,
1994). Importantly, the ﬁnding showing that employees can trigger
accuracy motivation (Study 4b) is a novel contribution to this literature
because accuracy motivation and deliberate thinking are typically
manipulated through experimenter-induced manipulations (e.g.,
Biesanz &Human, 2010; Darke et al., 1998; Thompson et al., 1994;
Vasilopoulos, Cucina, &McElreath, 2005). To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate that an interaction partner can
trigger accuracy motivation through a social process. Thus, we also
extend the literature on cognitive biases more generally, which does not
currently address how biases can be reduced through an interaction
partner, especially by someone who is ranked lower in the organiza-
tional hierarchy.
12.2. Practical implications
Managers often face severe time pressure, social responsibilities,
and other contextual demands (e.g., DeVoe & Pfeﬀer, 2011; Simon,
1956; Wright, 1974) and may not be motivated enough to allocate
suﬃcient cognitive resources to performance appraisals (e.g.,
Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Changing institutional norms to increase in-
dividuals’ accuracy motivation in the workplace is a challenge for
managers, employees, and organizations alike. Although interventions
are available to reduce intentional feedback inﬂation, our research
suggests that these tools may be insuﬃcient and that training also needs
to address the unintentional aspect of feedback inﬂation. Our studies
suggest several ways how inaccurate feedback delivery can be avoided
using theoretically motivated – but practically relevant – interventions
at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and organizational level.
Study 4a has practical implications for the individual manager.
Speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings suggest that simply educating managers that
their feedback may not be as evident to their employee was eﬀective in
reducing their unintentional transparency illusions. Although this in-
tervention seems easy to implement, it should be noted that it resulted
in both a signiﬁcant correction on the employee side as well as an
upward adjustment on the manager side. In addition, the pressures and
demands many managers face in modern organizations may cause them
to revert back to bad habits. Thus, organizations need to ensure that
managers receive continuous training (Fischhoﬀ, 1982) and constant
reminders of the fact that they may be subject to biases during feedback
delivery.
Study 4b demonstrates that employee requests for more accurate
feedback delivery by the manager can be eﬀective to receive more
veridical feedback. Perhaps one drawback of such an employee inter-
vention could be the fact that steep hierarchical structures often impede
upward communication, making these requests more diﬃcult to im-
plement (Festinger, 1950; Morrison, 2011). However, such challenges
could be mitigated, for example, by establishing a formal process
through which employees voice their expectations and desires prior to
the performance appraisal meeting, or by developing an organizational
culture that facilitates open and honest communication between em-
ployees and their supervisors (Edmondson, 1999; Morrison &Milliken,
2000). Future research could further explore how the framing of such
requests inﬂuences managers’ accuracy motivation.
Finally, Study 4c has practical implications for how organizations’
can prevent managers from delivering inaccurate performance feed-
back. Speciﬁcally, we have shown that making managers’ ﬁnancial
compensation contingent on their feedback delivery was suﬃcient to
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attenuate the illusion of transparency. In contrast to awareness (Study
4a) and accountability (Study 4b), incentives not only attenuated the
manager-employee diﬀerence but also generally led to more accurate
performance ratings (as compared to the rating managers were in-
structed to communicate). Thus, incentives not only eliminated the il-
lusion of transparency, but also led to a reduction of intentional feed-
back inﬂation as managers reported signiﬁcantly lower ratings in the
incentives condition compared to the control condition. This implies
that incentivizing managers to deliver their feedback accurately may
also be a fruitful way to address deliberate inﬂation of negative in-
formation that has been documented in other research (e.g.,
Dibble & Levine, 2010; Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Waung &Highhouse,
1997). However, monetary incentives also come with the disadvantage
that they are costly to administer, that they may make individuals feel
under-appreciated, and that removing them later on is likely to reverse
positive eﬀects (Gerhart & Fang, 2015).
12.3. Limitations and future research
Our ﬁndings also have limitations that provide exciting opportu-
nities for future research. First, although our studies focus on the most
widely occurring situation in organizations in which feedback is com-
municated “downward” by a manager to an employee (Bies, 2013;
Fisher, 1979; Heidemeier &Moser, 2009; Ilgen & Knowlton, 1980), fu-
ture research could explore in greater detail whether our eﬀects extend
to “upward” feedback and peer feedback (see also Schaerer, du Plessis,
Yap, & Thau, 2016). Research on power and employee voice suggests
that the illusion of transparency may be even more pronounced in
upward communication. Because of their rank and control over re-
sources, managers exert a great deal of power over their employees and
are less likely to be inﬂuenced by others (Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, man-
agers should be less concerned about protecting themselves and others
from the undesirable consequences associated with the delivery of ne-
gative feedback. Analogously, relatively powerless employees that
speak up may be labeled as ‘troublemakers’ for communicating un-
favorable feedback to their superiors (Morrison &Milliken, 2000),
which may lead to more indirect upward communication. These pre-
dictions are supported by ﬁndings showing that the illusion of trans-
parency also occurs in non-hierarchical relationships between close
others (Vorauer & Sucharyna, 2013) and is especially pronounced for
individuals with little power compared to those with a lot of power
(Garcia, 2002). Thus, it is likely that our ﬁndings are relevant for
downward, peer, and upward feedback alike.
Second, Studies 4a–4c revealed diﬀerential eﬀects of the three ac-
curacy motivation manipulations (awareness, accountability, and in-
centives) on manager and employee ratings. Although all three ma-
nipulations reduced the illusion of transparency, this attenuation was
primarily driven by a correction on the employee side (Studies 4b-4c)
but sometimes also by a correction of manager ratings (Study 4a). We
believe that the latter eﬀect emerged because managers were not held
accountable to communicate the negative feedback and instead chose
the “easy way out” by adjusting their own ratings. Indeed, Studies 4b
and 4c showed that holding managers accountable led them to com-
municate their feedback more accurately because they did so in a more
direct manner (Study 4c) rather than correcting their own rating. Thus,
interventions that increase people’s deliberate thinking may have dif-
ferential eﬀects in dynamic, interpersonal settings where people have
multiple ways of correcting for potential bias. Managers can adjust their
own rating, communicate their feedback more negatively, or both.
Since adjusting one’s own rating does not advance the goal of more
accurate feedback delivery, future research could test more system-
atically when diﬀerent types of accuracy motivation interventions
trigger one reaction versus another. The present research suggests that
interventions that aim to create greater manager accountability are
more likely to reduce or completely eliminate their transparency
illusions.
Third, our research assumes that managers are generally in-
suﬃciently motivated to be accurate when they communicate feedback.
A counterargument to this assumption is that aspects of our interven-
tion studies that increased accuracy motivation and thus eliminated
transparency illusions (e.g., awareness, training, tangible con-
sequences) are already present in real-world situations. However, the
idea that individuals are “cognitive misers” and only have a limited
amount of cognitive resources available is not new and has been a basic
premise of much behavioral and organizational research
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1982). After all, man-
agers are under constant time pressure (DeVoe & Pfeﬀer, 2011), have to
handle challenging and straining tasks (Campbell, 1988), and deal with
conﬂicting role demands (Anicich &Hirsh, 2017; Rizzo,
House, & Lirtzman, 1970). Thus, it is not surprising that real-world
professionals are as prone to suﬀer from superﬁcial processing and
biases as our ﬁeld study (Study 1) and other research has demonstrated
(Barnes, 1984; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Northcraft & Neale,
1987). In addition, one could argue that most managers with super-
visory responsibilities are properly trained in giving accurate feedback.
Yet, our ﬁeld study (Study 1) and the pilot study reported in footnote 7
found no eﬀect of managers’ supervisory experience or amount of
feedback training on the size of their transparency illusions. Further-
more, although most feedback training has focused on eliminating halo
eﬀects, increasing observational accuracy, distinguishing performance
dimensions, and reducing intentional feedback inﬂation
(DeNisi &Murphy, 2017; Roch, Woehr, Mishra, & Kieszczynska, 2012;
Smith, 1986; Waung &Highhouse, 1997), there is little training avail-
able that is concerned with eliminating unintentional inﬂation of
feedback.
Finally, the present research has focused on the delivery of accurate
feedback as one goal of performance appraisals. Yet, there may be other
goals of performance appraisals such as ensuring employee well-being
and retention, and these goals could potentially conﬂict with the ac-
curate delivery of feedback. Although communicating feedback less
accurately and directly may sometimes be desirable (e.g., to maintain
harmony), managers should at least be aware of this decision before
delivering negative feedback more positively than intended.
12.4. Conclusion
As managers often fail to deliver corrective feedback accurately and
a younger workforce increasingly demands candid feedback, scholars
and practitioners need to understand how feedback can be delivered
more eﬀectively. Combining insights from the literatures on feedback,
the illusion of transparency, and accuracy motivation, we proposed that
managers suﬀer from unintentional transparency illusions when deli-
vering negative feedback because they lack accuracy motivation. Our
approach is a departure from the traditional approach to treat feedback
inﬂation as intentional and complements this view by showing it also
has an unintentional component. Our results show that when managers
communicate negative feedback, they do this more clearly when their
accuracy motivation is high, reducing and sometimes completely
eliminating their transparency illusions.
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